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We explore the impact of mortgage securitization on the international diversification of 
macroeconomic risk. By making mortgage-related risks internationally tradeable, 
securitization contributes considerably to better international consumption risk sharing: we 
find that countries with the most highly developed markets for securitized mortgage debt have 
consumption responses to a typical idiosyncratic business cycle shock that are 20-30 percent 
less volatile than those experienced by countries that do not allow for mortgage securitization. 
Our results are based on quarterly data from a panel of 16 industrialized countries and cover 
the sample period 1985-2008Q1. They are robust to a range of controls for other aspects of 
financial globalization, international differences in the structure of housing markets and the 
financial system etc. Against the backdrop of the subprime crisis, these findings inevitably 
raise the question whether securitization could not just facilitate risk sharing in tranquil times 
but that it actually fails to provide international insurance in severe crisis periods. Indeed, we 
find that international risk sharing decreases in global asset price downturns and increases in 
booms. But we do not find evidence that countries with more developed securitization 
markets are systematically more exposed to these fluctuations in the extent to which risk can 
be shared across national boundaries. 
JEL Code: F36, F37, F41, G15, G21. 
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An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title Home Bias: Asset Prices, 
Securitization of Mortgage Debt and International Risk Sharing. We have benefited from 
remarks by seminar participants at the ZEW-Bundesbank Workshop on Housing and Asset 
Markets, the 3rd Zurich Macroeconomics and Finance Conference and at University of 
Stirling. In particular, we would like to thank Philipp Harms for his detailed discussion of the 
paper. We are also grateful to Sascha Becker and Jean Imbs for useful suggestions. Any errors 
remain entirely our own. 1 Introduction
The securitization of mortage-related debt has played a major role in the
emergence and proliferation of the current ￿nancial crisis (see Brunnermeier
(2008) for a detailed account). Understandably, this has led to widespread
scepticism with respect to the usefulness of such instruments for an e¢ cient
allocation of macroeconomic risk. From the current experience it seems
obvious that the repackaging of mortgage debt in mortgage backed securities
(MBS) can have enormous aggregate costs,1 but to date no empirical account
of the macroeconomic bene￿ts of these instruments exists.
In this paper we contribute to ￿lling this gap by exploring the impact that
the increasing use of mortgage securitization has had on the international
diversi￿cation of macroeconomic risk. From a theoretical point of view,
one may expect that the impact of mortgage securitization could be large.
Mortgage markets are internationally far less integrated than say equity
or bond markets. Residential real estate is largely domestically ￿nanced
in most economies, making ￿ uctuations in the value of housing and the
quality of mortgage debt a major background risk from the perspective of an
individual country. That the idiosyncratic component of such risks is likely
to be signi￿cant is illustrated in ￿gure (1), which plots the international
correlation of stock markets against that of residential housing prices: for
all of the 120 country pairs considered here, housing prices have much lower
international correlations than stock markets. This implies that ￿ uctuations
in the value of residential real estate (or of the debt collateralized on it) are a
signi￿cant idiosyncratic risk from the perspective of the individual economy.
1See Keys et al. (2008) and Mian and Su￿ (2008) for detailed empirical accounts of
how the originate-to-distribute model has led to moral hazard and lax screening in the
run-up to the subprime crisis. Demyanik and Van Hemert (2008) argue that even though
loan quality in the U.S mortgage market deteriorated long before the crisis, securitizers
were to some extent aware of this.
1Securitization can help diversify such risks internationally because it makes
mortgage-debt internationally tradeable.
Our evidence strongly supports this theoretical conjecture: we ￿nd that
over the last 20 years, the increasing securitization of mortgage debt has
contributed considerably to better international consumption risk sharing.
The e⁄ect is large: the countries with the most highly developed markets
for mortgage backed securities have consumption volatilities in response to a
typical idiosyncratic business cycle shock that are 20-30 percent lower than
experienced by countries that do not allow for securitization. These results
are robust to a range of controls for other aspects of ￿nancial globalization,
international di⁄erences in the structure of housing markets and the ￿nancial
system etc.
If securitization carries bene￿ts in terms of better international risk shar-
ing, this inevitably raises the question whether the costs in￿ icted by a major
downturn such as the current one could not still outweigh the potential wel-
fare bene￿ts of better international risk sharing by an order of magnitude.
Securitization may well facilitate risk sharing in tranquil times, but it might
actually make things worse in a crisis. We attempt to provide a quantita-
tive impression of this trade-o⁄ by asking to what extent international risk
sharing is dependent on the state of global asset markets. Indeed, we ￿nd
that international risk sharing increases in asset price booms and decreases
in recessions. At least based on data from previous asset market down-
turns, we do not ￿nd evidence that the ability to share risk across national
boundaries is generally more dependent on global asset market conditions
in countries with high levels of securitization than in countries where no
secondary markets for mortgage-debt exist. Our (macroeconomic) data set
covers the period from 1985 to the ￿rst quarter of 2008. Hence, it includes
2the onset of the current turmoil but does not yet cover the further unfolding
of events, including the demise of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or the after-
math of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The judgement on the role of
securitization for international transmission and risk sharing in the current
crisis is necessarily bound to remain out for now and we therefore do not
attempt to say anything on it here. We note, however, that recent events are
certainly in line with the view that securitization has contributed to turning
this crisis into the ￿rst globalized real estate bust. The fact that the costs
of the crisis are spread internationally ￿for better or worse ￿indicates that
markets for securitized mortgage credit do seem to provide international risk
sharing.
Our paper stands in the tradition of an empirical literature on interna-
tional consumption risk sharing, building on Słrensen and Yosha (1998) and
Crucini (1999). A number of papers in this branch of the literature have
recently come to document a positive impact of ￿nancial globalization on
international risk sharing (see Imbs (2006), Słrensen et al. (2007), Artis
and Ho⁄mann (2007, 2008)). Our paper is also closely related to work on
deregulation and risk sharing, speci￿cally to Demyanik et al (2007) who have
investigated the impact of banking deregulation on interstate risk sharing
in the US.
Very few papers have recognized the possibility that the extent of risk
sharing might vary over the economic cycle or with asset prices. We explore
this possibility here. In this respect we build on Ho⁄mann and Shcherbakova
(2008) and Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005, 2006). Ho⁄mann and
Shcherbakova (2008) show that interstate risk sharing in the U.S. increases
in booms and decreases in recessions. This cyclical dependence has, however,
been mitigated as a consequence of the liberalization of interstate banking
3markets during the 1980s. Here we adapt the empirical framework of this
previous study to explore the role that asset prices play for risk sharing
among countries. Another closely related paper is Lustig and van Nieuwer-
burgh (2006) who explore the role of time variation in collateral availability
for interstate risk sharing.
The paper is now structured as follows. In the next section, we present
our empirical framework. Section three presents our data set. Section four
presents the bulk of our empirical results. Section ￿ve summarizes and
concludes.
2 International Risk Sharing and the securitiza-
tion of mortgage debt

















t is per capita consumption in country k in period t, GDPk
t is the
country￿ s output per head and the asterisk denotes the international per
capita average of the respective variable. In such a regression, we can think
of the estimate of ￿U as measuring the amount of uninsured idiosyncratic
output risk.
Regressions such as (1) by now have some tradition in both the mi-
croeconometric as well as in the macro literature. Mace (1991), Cochrane
(1991) and Townsend (1994) were the ￿rst to suggest regressions similar to
(1) on household level data as a test of the null of complete markets. In a
world with complete markets, growth in marginal utility should be equated






where s indexes the state of nature and ￿ is the growth rate in the shadow
price of consumption.2 A key implication of (2) is that if risk is e¢ ciently
allocated, marginal utility growth should be independent of country-speci￿c
variables. To the extent that we can associate changes in marginal utility
with consumption growth, consumption growth should therefore be indepen-
dent of a country￿ s business cycle risks - regressions of the form (1) should
yield a coe¢ cient of zero. More recently, Asdrubali, Słrensen and Yosha
(1996) and Słrensen and Yosha (1998) have argued that the estimate of ￿U
may be more generally informative: even if the null of complete ￿nancial
markets is rejected, ￿U still is a measure of market incompleteness. In panel
regressions, ￿U is regularly between 0 and unity, so that 1￿￿U can straight-
forwardly be interpreted as the share of the average country￿ s idiosyncratic
business cycle risk that gets laid o⁄ in ￿nancial markets, whereas ￿U is the
portion of non-diversi￿ed idiosyncratic risk faced by the average country.
Early estimates of ￿U based on international data typically were in the
range between 0:7 and 0:8. Estimates based on more recent data are typ-
ically considerably lower, re￿ ecting the e⁄ect of ￿nancial globalization on
international risk sharing (see Słrensen et al (2007), Artis and Ho⁄mann
(2008)).
In this paper, we wish to explore to what extent ￿U varies across coun-
2This formulation of the optimal risk sharing condition abstracts from real exchange
rate ￿ uctuations (see Backus and Smith (1993)). Here, we follow the bulk of the litera-
ture on international consumption risk sharing that has predominantly used risk sharing
regressions such as (1) to study the impact of globalization on risk sharing. Ho⁄mann
(2008) reports the conclusions as to how much risk is shared through ￿nancial markets
remain una⁄ected by controlling for real exchange rate movements in regressions such as
(1).
5tries depending on whether and to which degree securitization of mortgage
related debt is used. Our basic tool will be panel regressions in which we
parametrize the coe¢ cient ￿U as a linear function of securitization and of
other country- and time-varying controls, so that
￿k
U(t) = ￿0 + zk0
t ￿z (3)
where zk
t is a vector containing time-varying and country-speci￿c charac-
teristics. We partition zk
t into aggregate, x0
t, and (time-invariant) country-
speci￿c characteristics, vk. In addition, we also allow for some characteristics
to vary by country and time, y0k













t + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
t
where ￿k is a country-￿xed e⁄ect and ￿t a common time e⁄ect. Here, and in
the remainder of the paper, we use lower-case letters to denote logarithms,








. Plugging (3) into this regression speci￿cation
and controlling for ￿rst-order partial e⁄ects we obtain an estimable relation
which is
￿e ck






t ￿ + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
t (4)
Note that in this speci￿cation we will not generally need to include all
the uninteracted terms zk
t. The reason for this is that the time-variation
in aggregate variables will be captured through the panel time-speci￿c ef-
fects. Equally, as long as the country-speci￿c characteristics are assumed to
be time-invariant, these will be fully captured by the country ￿xed-e⁄ects.
Hence, the speci￿cation above will include the ￿rst-order terms only for
6yk
t , characteristics (such as our indicator of securitization) that vary across
countries and time.
In our baseline speci￿cation, the vector zk
t will include a qualitative
measure that indicates to what extent mortgage securitization can actually
be used in country k in year t.3 We abbreviate this indicator with SECk
t so
that the baseline regression we estimate is
￿e ck
t = ￿0￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t ￿ ￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
t (5)
We enrich this speci￿cation as we go along with a range of controls
for ￿nancial globalization, other characteristics of the ￿nancial system and
the housing market etc. In addition, we conduct a number of simulation
and sample split exercises. Our result is quite clear cut: ￿1 is signi￿cantly
negative ￿the securitization of mortgage debt seems to be associated with
better international risk sharing. Before presenting these results, we describe
our data set.
3 Data
3.1 Country sample, output and consumption data
Our sample comprises the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada ,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
We obtain quarterly, real consumption p.c. and real GDP p.c. from the
IMF￿ s Financial Statistics. Consumption and GDP are de￿ ated with the
respective countries￿CPI and population ￿gures. International consumption
and GDP are calculated by normalizing price indices of all countries to 100
3In the next section, we describe in detail how we constructed this measure.
7in 1998Q4 and by converting GDP of each country into 1998Q4 dollar values
as in Słrensen et al. (2007).
Unless otherwise noted, the sample period for all our regression speci￿-
cations is 1985Q1 to 2008Q1.
3.2 Measuring the Securitization of Mortgage Debt
In our empirical analysis, we propose a qualitative indicator of securitization
that we abbreviate with SECk
t . We codify SECk
t based on the information
on the use of mortgage backed securities from Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004)
and date the start of mortgage securitization in a country based on informa-
tion from the OECD (Girouard and Bl￿ndal, 2001), the ECB (ECB, 2003)
and national sources. Before the de iure introduction of securitization in
country k, we assign a value of zero to SECk
t . From the date when securiti-
zation was introduced onwards, SECk
t is assigned a positive value between
zero and unity, depending on the degree to which the secondary market




> > > > <
> > > > :
1 liberalized market for mortgage backed securities
0:3 intermediate forms of securitization
0 no securitization allowed.
Speci￿cally, we set SECk
t to unity for all countries that, in a given pe-
riod t, have an essentially fully liberalized secondary market for mortgage
backed securities (MBS). For the US, which has probably the most liquid
market for MBS and where these instruments have been in use since after
the great depression, SEC is unity for the entire sample period (which for
most speci￿cations will start from 1985). Our indicator switches from zero
8to unity for those countries that during our sample period undertook major
liberalizations by allowing a far-reaching use of securitized mortgage debt:
Australia (1995), Canada (1987), the Netherlands (1996), Spain (1992) and
the United Kingdom (1987).
There are some countries that do allow for a somewhat more limited
degree of securitization, e.g. in the form of "Pfandbriefe" ( a special form of
covered bonds) as in Germany, Switzerland or Sweden (see Tsatsaronis and
Zhu (2004)). For this second group of countries we assign a value of SECk
t =
0:3.4 Germany , Sweden and Switzerland have a long tradition of using these
assets that by far precedes our sample period, so that SEC is constant for
these countries.5 Countries that introduced similar intermediate forms of
securitization during our sample period and for which SECk
t switches from
zero to 0:3 were Finland (1989) and France (1991). Finally, some countries
do not so far allow any form of securitization of mortgage debt so that
SECk
t = 0 for the entire sample period. This third group includes Denmark,
Italy, Japan, Belgium and Norway.
Figure (2) provides an optical impression of how the use of securitization
in mortgage markets spread across countries and over time: at each point
in time we report the cross-sectional average of SECk
t . As is apparent from
the graph, there is considerable variation in the degree to and the exact
time at which countries would allow securitization of mortgage debt. There
is, however, virtually no change in countries￿relative positions in terms of
securitization before the late 1980s. Our analysis therefore focuses mainly
on the period since 1985.
4We experimented with various values from 0.1. to 0.5 to qualitatively account for this
mezzanine form of mortgage securitization. None of our results depends on the particular
choice of value.
5E.g. "Pfandbriefe" as a means of mortgage securitization ￿rst emerged in late 19th
century Prussia
9There are two reasons why we use a qualitative measure of securitization
instead of a volume-based measure: the ￿rst is that data on the actual extent
to which mortgage debt is securitized is not available for many countries and
over long time spans. This makes the use of a volume-based measure all but
impossible for our purposes.
The second, potentially even more important reason is that the quali-
tative measure not only focuses on the amount of outstanding securitized
debt but also on the ease at which this debt can be traded and the extent
to which the issuer remains exposed to ￿ uctuations in the value of the col-
lateral. These legal di⁄erences should matter for risk sharing because they
mean that securities collateralized by mortgage debt may e⁄ectively repre-
sent di⁄erent assets when issued in di⁄erent countries and under di⁄erent
jurisdictions. Clearly, such di⁄erences cannot be captured by a sheer com-
parison of volumes or by looking at the share of securitized debt in total
outstanding mortgage debt.6
Nonetheless we attempted to collect time series on outstanding secu-
ritized mortgage debt and were successful for a subset of countries in our
sample, even though the comparability of these data across countries remains
an issue. We describe these data and their relation to the qualitative securi-
tization measure in the appendix, where we also present further robustness
checks based on the volume-based measures. In spite of our reservations
concerning the volume-based measures, the results from this exercise line
6A point in case is the disctinction between covered bonds and mortgage backed secu-
rities. Switzerland and Germany are countries with relatively large markets for covered
bonds, but the issuers remain exposed in the sense that they have to ensure that the collat-
eral remains of good quality by taking individual bad loans out. This is marked contrast to
the MBS that are in use, say, in the United States. Though the more far-reaching form of
securitization in the US may raise important issues of moral hazard, it may still be more
e⁄ective with respect to risk sharing. This line of reasoning is supported by the results
of Loutskina and Strahan (2009) who ￿nd that securitization has lowered the dependence
of credit supply on lender ￿nancial conditions. We would expect this to improve the risk
sharing possibilities of borrowers.
10up with our results from the qualitative measure as we present them in the
main body of the paper.
3.3 Other mortgage market characteristics
In the course of our analysis, we will check whether our securitization in-
dicator could not just pick up other characteristics of national mortgage
markets and of the ￿nancial system more generally. Speci￿cally, we look at
how mortgage interest rates are set (￿xed vs. ￿ exible), the possibility for
mortgage equity withdrawal, the maximum loan-to-value ratio and the valu-
ation method used (historical property valuation vs. market value method).
For all these mortgage market characteristics we construct dummies, as-
signing the values provided in table 2 of Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) to the
countries in our sample.
3.4 Indicators of ￿nancial globalization and asset prices
An additional robustness check we will perform is to assess the importance
of the increase in cross-holdings of foreign assets for our results. We employ
the Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2003, 2007) external wealth of nations (EWN)
dataset for this exercise and calculate their measures of ￿nancial integra-








t gross foreign assets of country k at time t and FLk
t gross foreign












t) the stock of
portfolio equity assets (liabilities) and FDIAk
t (FDILk
t) the stock of direct
investment assets (liabilities). Since the EWN data is annual, we calculate
quarterly estimates by linear interpolation of year to year growth rates. As
an alternative to the linear interpolation we also calculate quarterly values
11using our measure of global asset market conditions (see below) as a scaling
factor for the interpolated trend in gfa and geq.
As measure of swings of global asset prices, we consider short-run varia-
tions of the U.S. consumption-wealth ratio that we approximate using Let-
tau￿ s and Ludvigson￿ s (2001) cay, the residual of a cointegrating relationship
between consumption, asset wealth and labor income for the US. Lettau and
Ludvigson show that cay is an excellent indicator of asset price cycles in US
data. Nitschka (2007) extends this result by showing that cay explains
a large share of the variation in asset prices in a cross-section of indus-
trialised economies. We therefore use cay as an indicator of global asset
market conditions. The data is freely available on Martin Lettau￿ s website:
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lettau/data/cay_q_07Q4.txt
4 Results
Table I displays the results from our baseline regression (5):
￿e ck
t = ￿0￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t ￿ ￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
t (6)
We report results for the sample period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1 in panel
A of Table I. Robust t-statistics appear below the estimates in parentheses.
Taken alone, the estimate of ￿0 in panel A would suggest that about 79% of
international consumption risk remains uninsured in the time period from
1985Q1 to 2008Q1. However, the impact of securitization on risk sharing as
mirrored in the ￿1 coe¢ cient is not negligible. Securitization improves risk
sharing. The coe¢ cient ￿1 is negative, signi￿cant and the e⁄ect is large:
for the sample period from 1985 to 2008 the estimate of ￿1 implies that
the countries with the most liquid markets for securitized mortgage debt
12achieved 35 percentage points more consumption risk sharing than countries
in which securitization of mortgage debt is not allowed.
Panel B of Table I shows the corresponding estimates for the time period
from 1995Q1 - 2008Q1. In that time period almost all of the countries under
study introduced some form of mortgage payments securitization. Our main
conclusion does not only remain unaltered but is even more pronounced.
Securitization seems to have an even stronger repercussion on international
consumption risk sharing.
A sceptic might argue that we put a lot and maybe too much emphasis
on the equity price surge in the late 1990s as well as the house price upswing
in recent years. Panel C reports our basline regression estimates for the time
period from 1985Q1 to 1996Q4, thus excluding the impact of global asset
price movements in the past decade. The estimate of ￿0 remains almost
unaltered. Not surprisingly, the e⁄ect of securitization on international risk
sharing is weaker (￿1 = ￿0:23) but the estimate remains highly signi￿cant.
The results in Table I are suggestive of a bene￿cial impact of the se-
curitization of mortgage-related risks on international risk sharing. The
subsample analysis shows that this e⁄ect is most pronounced in recent years
consistent with the view that securitization really took o⁄ in the 1990s.
Figure 3 displays the amount of home mortgages outstanding used to back
securities in the U.S. This data is from the Federal Reserve￿ s Flow of Funds
Accounts and covers the period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1. It underscores that
securitization gained importance during the 1990s with a clear upward trend
and explosive growth starting around 2004.7 However, even if we negelect
the past decade, securitization of mortgage related risks still has a signi￿cant
bene￿cial impact on international risk sharing.
7While we do not have comparable data for most other countries, for those we do (such
as e.g. Australia), similar trends are discernible.
13Our ￿ndings inevitably raise the question whether mortgage securitiza-
tion could not be associated with other time-invariant country-characteristics,
such as e.g. a more market based ￿nancial system, which would itself lead
to more international risk sharing. We address this concern by sorting the
16 countries under study into three bins according to their level of securi-
tization as indicated by SECk
t : the lowest quartile (bin 1), the second and
third quartile (bin 2) and the highest quartile (bin 3). We repeat this sorting
procedure every quarter for the time period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1 such
that we obtain three synthetic panels of representative observations for low,
middle and high securitization country samples. Since our measure of secu-
ritization takes discrete values, the sorting of countries into bins at a given
point in time may not always be unique. To resolve potential ties, in each
period, we add small white noise random disturbances to SECk
t and per-
form the sorting into bins based on this noisy measure.8 We then estimate
the risk sharing regression
￿e ck
t = ￿U￿g gdp
k
t + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
t (7)
for the low securitization and the high securitization bins, separately, i.e.
for k 2 I
high




t denotes the set of countries
that have the highest/lowest degree of securitization at time t.
We repeat this exercise 100 times (each time disturbing SECk
t with
small shocks) to obtain a series of risk sharing coe¢ cients, ￿U, for the
high and low securitization groups that is immune against a speci￿c and
possibly biased sorting of countries into the high and low securitization
8We choose the variance of the noise term su¢ cently low so that the randomization
does not a⁄ect the ordering across categories, i.e. a country with SEC
k
t = 1 will always
be considered more liberalized than a country with SEC
k
t = 0:3.
14bins. Table II presents the average of these risk sharing coe¢ cient esti-
mates. About 77% of consumption growth risks of the low securitization
group remain uninsured while the high securitization group countries leave
on average 60% of consumption growth not shared. Countries that have
the opportunity to share their mortgage risks internationally via ￿nancial
markets reduce the exposure of consumption to idiosyncratic output shocks
by 22% ((0:77 ￿ 0:60)=0:77) compared to countries that do not allow for
mortgage backed securities. Note that in our procedure observations on
idiosyncratic consumption and GDP growth change panel group a¢ liation
as countries change their relative degree of securitization. Therefore, these
results strongly indicate that the e⁄ect of securitization on risk sharing that
we pick up here is systematic and not likely to be incidentally related to
other, unobserved (or uncontrolled) country-characteristics.
Taken together our main ￿ndings suggest that the securitization of mort-
gage related risks considerably improves international risk sharing. In the
remainder of this paper we assess the robustness of this conclusion further.
4.1 Securitization and international ￿nancial integration
Securitization of mortgage related debt seems to improve international risk
sharing, which suggests that it is an important aspect of ￿nancial global-
ization. However, this could just be another facet of the secular growth
in international gross asset holdings that we have seen since the early/mid
1990s (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2007)). Słrensen et al. (2007)
and Artis and Ho⁄mann (2008) document that the increase in cross-border
asset holdings is echoed in improved international consumption risk sharing.
Since the increase in gross foreign asset holdings worldwide coincides with
the period at which securitization has been introduced in various countries
15in our sample, our securitization indicator could just pick up this trend in
￿nancial globalization. Not so: we parameterize risk sharing as a function
of a ￿nancial globalization trend
￿k
U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1SECk
t + ￿2gfat + ￿3gfat ￿ SECk
t + ￿4t (8)









average gross foreign asset positions of the countries under study relative to
GDP with FAkt (FLkt) denoting gross foreign assets (liabilities) of country
k at time t. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003, 2007) propose gfat as
a measure of the trend in ￿nancial integration. As data of foreign asset
positions is only available until the end of 2004 we have to restrict our
sample period to 1985Q1 - 2004Q4. Quarterly estimates of gross foreign
assets are obtained through linear interpolation. Table III summarizes the
results. None of our results changes if we use a purely equity-based measure











A.I in the appendix) and/or calculate quarterly estimates that are not based
on linear interpolation but rely on movements in global asset prices. In
addition, our main result remains unaltered if we consider gfak
t or geqk
t as
measures of ￿nancial integration, i.e. we take into account the di⁄erent
degree of ￿nancial integration across countries. Table A.II and A.III in the
appendix present the corresponding regression estimates.
The ￿rst line of Table III gives our basic risk sharing regression for that
time period, now also taking account of a linear time trend interacted with
GDP growth. The estimates show that our securitization dummy does not
re￿ ect a simple time trend. The coe¢ cient of the securitization dummy is
negative, statistically signi￿cant and in the range of values obtained for our
16full sample period.
We corroborate this ￿nding even if, in addition, we consider the trend in
￿nancial integration. The second line of table III displays the corresponding
estimates. Financial integration seems to be helpful in improving consump-
tion risk sharing as is mirrored in the negative ￿2. It is not signi￿cant at the
95 percent but 90 percent con￿dence level thus supporting Słrensen et al.
(2007) and Artis and Hofmann (2008). In addition, the coe¢ cient of SECk
t
remains virtually unaltered. Securitization improves international risk shar-
ing. More importantly, this result is independent of the increase in ￿nancial
integration as measured by gross foreign asset holdings.
For the sake of completeness, the third line of Table III gives the risk
sharing coe¢ cient estimates when we consider all three variables jointly
while the forth line reports estimates when the interaction of ￿nancial inte-
gration and securitization is considered. We see some quantitative but no
qualitative di⁄erences compared to the previous exercises. Both ￿nancial
integration and securitization of mortgage related risks reduce the amount
of unshared idiosyncratic consumption growth risk, but these e⁄ects are
independent of each other. We do not report estimates of ￿1 as they are
insigni￿cant throughout.
4.2 Securitization and other characteristics of mortgage ￿-
nance markets
The structure of mortgage markets di⁄ers across countries in many respects.
The degree to which securitization is possible is just one of them. Tsatsaronis
and Zhu (2004) distinguish between three di⁄erent groups of OECD coun-
tries based on di⁄erences in the following dimensions: i) the extent to which
securitization of mortgage payments is used, ii) the ￿ exibility of mortgage
17interest rate agreements, iii) the valuation method employed to determine
the mortgage lending volume, iv) the maximum loan-to-value ratio and v)
the use of mortgage equity withdrawal. A couple of countries that have
liberalized their secondary markets for mortgage debt also allow for mort-
gage equity withdrawal. On the other hand, countries that do not allow the
securitization of mortgage payments also forbid the use of mortgage equity
withdrawal etc. Hence, our securitization dummy could re￿ ect one of the
other distinguishing features of national mortgage ￿nance markets.
To alleviate concerns in this respect we take data on mortgage rates
(￿ exible vs. ￿xed), mortgage equity withdrawal (allowed and used vs. not
allowed or not used), maximum loan to valuation ratio and valuation method
(historical prices vs. market valuation) from table 2 in Tsatsaronis and Zhu
(2004) to construct qualitative measures for all of these di⁄erent charac-
teristics of mortgage ￿nance systems just as for securitization.9 We then
parameterize
￿U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1SECk
t + ￿2Xk
t + ￿3t (9)
with Xk
t representing one of the qualitative measures of the other mortgage
market characteristis such as ￿ exibility of mortgage interest rates (MR),
mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW), loan to valuation ratio (LTV ) and
valuation method (V M). We use the full sample period from 1985Q1 to
2008Q1.
Table IV reports if these di⁄erent mortgage market characteristics in￿ u-
ence risk sharing when considered on their own (in each case the ￿rst of the
two lines) and, speci￿cally, if the other characteristics drive out the impact
9Unfortunately, we do not have exact information about the time at which e.g. mort-
gage equity withdrawal has been allowed in the various countries, such that we have to
assume that the di⁄erences across countries with regard to the pro￿le of mortgage ￿nance
systems prevailed for the whole sample period.
18of securitization on international risk sharing (the second line respectively).
The results are easily summarized: none of the individual mortgage market
characteristics other than securitization is statistically signi￿cant. The coef-
￿cients are all positive meaning that e.g. more mortgage equity withdrawal
is, if anything, associated with less international risk sharing. Securitization
seems to be special in this respect.
The second lines in the panels labelled MR, MEW, LTV and V M
report the estimates for the case when SECk
t is also included. Most of
the other mortgage market features now seem to statistically signi￿cantly
in￿ uence consumption risk sharing, though it may be hard to interpret these
coe¢ cients intuitively. However, securitization is always still signi￿cant, the
coe¢ cient estimate negative and almost unaltered when compared to the
previous regressions where SECk
t was the only variable interacted with GDP
growth.
The bottom line of the results reported in Table IV is clear: our ￿nding
that securitization increases international risk sharing does not seem to be
in￿ uenced by controls for other characteristics of mortgage markets.
4.3 Monte Carlo Simulations
Our results that securitization of mortgage debt increases international risk
sharing appears robust to a range of controls for ￿nancial globalization, dif-
ferences in the ￿nancial system. However, it is always conceivable that we
have neglected other developments that could have a⁄ected international
risk sharing over the sample period and that our securitization indicator
just picks up the cumulative impact of these developments. We therefore
conduct a Monte Carlo exercise in which we demonstrate that both the
precise timing and the extent to which securitization was allowed matter
19for our results. In the setup of our experiment, we follow Aghion et al.
(2008) and Ho⁄mann and Shcherbakova (2008) and randomly assign secu-
ritization indicators to countries. Speci￿cally, for all 16 countries we draw
from the empirical distribution of SECk
t to generate a "placebo" measure of
the timing and degree of securitization, SEC
P;k
t : We repeat this procedure
1000 times. For each draw, we then perform two checks: ￿rst, we run the
regression
￿e ck









t +￿+￿k +￿t +"k
t (10)
to check in how many cases ￿P
1 would be negative and more signi￿cant than
the actual SECk
t . Second, we consider both the placebo and the actual
securitization indicator jointly and report in how many cases their regression
coe¢ cients are individually negative and signi￿cant, i.e.
￿e ck













Panel A of Table V presents the results when we ask about the signif-
icance of the placebo indicator. We see that the coe¢ cient of the placebo
securitization measure is negative and more signi￿cant than the actual mea-
sure in no more than about 1.9% of all cases if taken alone.
Panel B of table V displays that when both the placebo and the actual
securitization measure are considered jointly, the placebo measure turns out
to be individually negatively signi￿cant in roughly 4 percent of all draws
while the actual securitization measure is signi￿cant in 95 percent of all cases.
These Monte Carlo simulations thus underscore that our results are not the
outcome of pure chance: the extent and the timing at which securitization of
mortgage debt has been introduced is crucial in order to identify the impact
20of securitization on international consumption risk sharing. In view of these
results it appears highly unlikely that other developments that just broadly
unfolded in the same way as the use of mortgage securitization can account
for the signi￿cance of our main results.
4.4 Securitization, global asset price cycles and international
risk sharing
The notion we have sought to convey in our analysis is that securitization
of mortgage related risks reduces an economy￿ s exposure (in terms of con-
sumption) to idiosyncratic business cycle shocks. Prima facie, this message
seems to be disconnected from the current crisis in international ￿nancial
markets. Policymakers worldwide worry if and to what extent the current
swings in global asset prices feed back on the real economy. Furthermore,
the trigger of the current crisis were losses on securities that were backed by
mortgages to U.S. households with poor or no credit rating.
We make the following remarks: increased international risk sharing
inevitably increases the relative importance of global shocks for the volatility
of consumption. In fact, the view that securitization of mortgage debt has
contributed to turning a national real estate boom into what is the ￿rst
globalized housing bust is not at all inconsistent with our ￿ndings here. For
better or for worse it suggests that securitization does help to share the costs
of the crisis internationally.
More immediately relevant for our analysis here is however the possi-
bility that the extent to which international risk sharing is possible could
itself be subject to variation over time. If securitization facilitates inter-
national risk pooling mainly in tranquil periods but risk sharing becomes
all but impossible in periods of severe global turbulence, then the potential
21macroeconomic bene￿ts from securitization could be much smaller than is
suggested by our previous results.
We address this concern by asking to what extent risk sharing varies as
a function of global asset market conditions. We focus on asset prices as
indicator of global asset market conditions. The role of asset price ￿ uctua-
tions in driving leverage and liquidity in the recent years (and their role on
accelerating the deleveraging process in the current crisis) has been stressed
by Adrian and Shin (2008). Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2006) point at
the importance of real estate prices in explaining collateral availability and
the extent of risk sharing among US regions. Ho⁄mann and Shcherbakova
(2008) highlight the importance of stock price movements for risk sharing
among U.S. regions. Risk sharing increases in times of high asset prices and
decreases in times of low asset prices. Employing the risk sharing regression
with interaction terms as we do in this paper, their stand-in for high/low
asset prices is the residual of the U.S. consumption-wealth ratio, cay, which
is a powerful predictor of expected returns on the U.S. stock market (Let-
tau and Ludvigson (2001)). Nitschka (2007) shows that U.S. cay can also
be used as a forecasting variable of the G7 stock market returns. We repeat
this forecasting exercise for stock market excess returns of the countries in
our sample and con￿rm the predictive power of cay: a temporarily high
consumption-wealth ratio predicts high future stock market returns.(results
not reported but available upon request).
We therefore use cay as proxy for global asset price movements and
parameterize the risk sharing coe¢ cient ￿U(t) as
￿k
U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1cayt + ￿2SECk
t + ￿3cayt ￿ SECk
t + ￿4t
22adding one of the terms on the right hand side at a time. Table VI summa-
rizes the results.
First, we ask if we ￿nd dependence of international risk sharing on move-
ments in global asset prices. The answer to this question is yes if we consider
the interaction of cayt with GDP growth on its own. The coe¢ cient ￿1is
statistically signi￿cant and positive, i.e. high cayt (low asset prices) are as-
sociated with less risk sharing. We thus corroborate one of the results in
Ho⁄mann and Shcherbakova (2008) in an international context. Figure 4
further illustrates this result. Here we plot cayt (dashed line) against the
sequence of coe¢ cients ￿U(t) (solid line) obtained from the cross-sectional
regressions
￿e ck
t = ￿U(t)￿g gdp
k
t + ￿t + "k
t
where ￿t is the time t speci￿c constant. Since these cross-sectional esti-
mates of ￿U(t) are very noisy and in order to emphasize the business-cycle
frequency movements in risk sharing, we take a 12-quarter moving average
of the ￿U(t) coe¢ cients. As is apparent, uninsured consumption risk and
cayt move together for most of the sample period (a correlation of 0:64):
international risk sharing tends to be high when global asst prices are high
and vice versa.10
Next we additionally consider the interaction of our securitization dummy
with idiosyncratic GDP growth. These estimates, reported in the second line
10We also explored the possibility that international risk sharing could vary simply be-
cause downturns are generally more common than upswings, which could suggest that
there is simply less idiosyncratic risk to share in recessions. Since this asymmetry has
mainly been documented with respect to the output cycle, we therefore included aggre-
gate GDP growth instead of cay in the set of interaction terms. Unlike cay, however,
this variable did not turn out to be signi￿cant in the risk sharing regression. The up and
down of international risk sharing seems to explained by time-varying frictions in inter-
national asset markets ￿the channel that is our focus here ￿and not by world business
cycle ￿ uctuations per se. We thank Jean Imbs for suggesting this check. Ho⁄mann and
Shcherbakova (2008) investigate the role of aggregate GDP ￿ uctuations for risk sharing
among U.S. regions in detail.
23of Table VI, convey a clear message. Even if we take account of global asset
price ￿ uctuations, securitization of mortgage debt still increases interna-
tional risk sharing signi￿cantly and the order of magnitude of the coe¢ cient
on SECk
t remains unchanged.
The third line of Table VI provides estimates when we also take account
of a possible interaction between asset price movements and securitization.
This speci￿cation explicitly allows the sensitivity of risk sharing to global
asset market conditions to depend on whether a country has a developed
market for securitized mortgage debt. There is no evidence for this. If
anything, securitization would seem to lower the dependence of a country￿ s
ability to share risk to global asset market conditions ￿though insigni￿-
cant, the coe¢ cient ￿3 is negative. Note also that the coe¢ cient on cay
alone, ￿1, now also becomes insigni￿cant. The relation between global asset
price movements as echoed in cayt and international risk sharing essentially
breaks down if we also take account of a time trend. In all cases, the securi-
tization coe¢ cient alone, ￿2, is virtually unchanged. We conclude from this
exercise that international risk sharing does seem to depend on global asset
market conditions, increasing in asset price booms and markedly decreas-
ing in downturns. But we do not ￿nd that countries with more developed
markets for securitization are systematically more or less exposed to this
phenomenon.
5 Conclusions
The securitization of mortgage related debt improves international risk shar-
ing because it makes the idiosyncratic risks associated with this debt interna-
tionally tradeable. The e⁄ect is large: for countries with the most developed
secondary markets for mortgage-related debt the volatility of consumption
24conditional on an idiosyncratic business cycle shocks is between 20 and 30
percentage points lower than for countries in which such markets do not
exist. We ￿nd that this result is robust to a range of controls for other
aspects of ￿nancial globalization and that it is independent of international
di⁄erences in ￿nancial systems, other systematic di⁄erences in housing and
mortgage markets etc.
Against the backdrop of the current crisis our ￿ndings raise the question
whether securitization could not just help pooling risks in tranquil times,
leaving the possibility that international risk sharing all but dries up in busts.
Indeed we ￿nd that the extent to which international risk sharing is possible
does depend on global asset market conditions: risk sharing increases during
asset price booms and decreases sharply in busts. However, even taking
account of the most recent downturn (our sample ends in the ￿rst quarter of
2008), we do not ￿nd evidence that countries with highly developed markets
for securitized mortgage debt are necessarily more exposed to the global
asset price cycle. These ￿ndings are consistent with recent events: they
underscore that securitization of mortgage debt was crucial in turning the
US subprime crisis into what may well be the ￿rst globalized real estate
bust.
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28Appendix: Results based on securitization ratios
The main part of our analysis has relied on a qualitative measure of
the extent of securitization. This was partly due to the lack of appropri-
ate data for the countries and time series under study. Ideally, one would
like to have information about the amount outstanding of mortgage backed
securities and relate them to the amount of outstanding mortgages in an
economy. Only recently, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets As-
sociation (SIFMA) started to collect data on issuance of asset backed secu-
rities. Therefore, we do our best to calculate actual measures of the degree
of securitization. We use national sources to obtain such admittedly crude
mortgage securitization ratios for the United States, Australia, Germany
and Switzerland.
The U.S. Flow of Fund Accounts provide information about the amount
outstanding of mortgages used to back securities. We take the ratio of this
number with the amount of outstanding home mortgages in U.S. households￿
balance sheets as proxy for the degree of securitization. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Australia gives similar information but for new issues of mortgages
and mortgage backed securities such that the Australian securitization ratio
is calculated in basically the same way. Furthermore, the Deutsche Bun-
desbank publishes data on the total amount outstanding of issued bonds
and bonds covered by mortgages (Hypothekenpfandbriefe). The respective
ratio gives the degree of mortgage securitization in Germany. The Swiss
National Bank publishes new issues of mortgage covered bonds and of the
total amount of bonds. Again the ratio is used as indicator of the degree of
securitization. Together with the ￿ve countries that do not allow for mort-
gage securitization we run our basic risk sharing regression for this smaller
panel of nine countries for the time period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1. Table
A.IV reports the results.
Panel A of Table A.IV provides the corresponding estimates if we use
our qualitative measure of securitization taking account of a time trend
interaction with GDP. These estimates just reproduce our main results for
ease of comparison.
Panel B displays the corresponding results for our actual mortgage secu-
ritization proxy. The corresponding interaction coe¢ cient is large, negative
but not signi￿cant at the 95% con￿dence level with a t-statistic of 1.57 (the
p-value is 0.14).
29Our measure of actual securitization is a very crude one as the data is
not internationally comparable: First, we have outstanding debt for some
countries and only new issues for others.11 Secondly, as we have discussed
in the main text, the de-facto measures will not capture the extent to which
securitized mortgage debt issued in di⁄erent countries represents a di⁄erent
asset with di⁄erent legal implications for issuers and buyers and therefore
for risk sharing. In spite of these limitations of the de facto measure, our
results here still convey the notion that securitization contributes to better
international risk sharing.
11For those countries for which we only have new issues, we tried to obtain stocks
through the application of a ￿ perpetucal inventory method￿ , assuming that 20 percent of
the outstanding debt gets repaid every year. Doing so did not a⁄ect the results, but clearly
the cumulated stocks would also be very imprecisely measured.
30Table I: Securitization and international risk sharing
The table displays the estimates from our baseline risk sharing regression:
￿e ck









t denotes idiosyncratic consumption growth, ￿g gdp
k
t idiosyncratic GDP growth
and SECk
t is a qualitative measure that indicates when and to what extent country k
has introduced the securitization of mortgage payments. Robust t-statistics (Newey and West
(1987)) are in parentheses below the estimates.
Baseline regression:
￿e ck
t = ￿0￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t ￿ ￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
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31Table II: Risk sharing in high/low securitization countries
We sort the 16 countries under study into three bins according to their level of securitization
SECk
t at time t: We repeat this sorting procedure every quarter for the time period from
1985Q1 to 2008Q1 such that we obtain synthetic low, middle and high securitization country
panels. Since SECk
t is a qualitative measure, it is possible that there are ties in this sorting
procedures (e.g. at a given point in time, there may be more than a quarter of countries
that have the lowest degree of securitization SECk
t = 0.). We resolve such ties through




t + ￿ + ￿k + ￿t + "k
t for the ￿rst quartile (low securitization) and fourth
quartile (high securitization). To ascertain that random assignment to bins in the case of ties
does not a⁄ect our results, we repeated this exercise 100 times to obtain an entire series of
risk sharing coe¢ cients, ￿U . The table reports averages of these risk sharing coe¢ cients.
Average Newey-West corrected t-statistics (Newey and West (1987)) over these 100 draws are
in parentheses.






32Table III: Trend in ￿nancial integration and securitization
The table presents estimates from the regression:
￿e ck



















with FAkt gross foreign assets of country k at time
t and FLkt gross foreign liabilities of country k at time t. It thus summarizes the gross
foreign asset positions of the countries under study relative to GDP. Robust t-statistics (Newey
and West (1987)) appear in parentheses below the estimates. The sample period runs from
1985Q1 to 2004Q4.
sample period: 1985Q1 - 2004Q4
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33Table IV: Securitization and other mortgage market pro￿les
The table presents estimates from the regression
￿e ck










U(t) := ￿0 + zk0




t representing one of the dummys of the other mortgage market characteristis such as
￿exibility of mortgage interest rates (MR), mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW ), loan to
valuation ratio (LTV ) and valuation method (V M). Robust t-statistics (Newey and West
(1987)) appear in parentheses below the estimates. The sample period runs from 1985Q1 to
2008Q1.
sample period: 1985Q1 - 2008Q1






















































34Table V: Monte Carlo Simulations
This table provides evidence from a Monte Carlo experiment in which we randomly assign the
values that indicate the degree of securitization to each country. We draw from the empirical
distribution of SECk
t and repeat this procedure 1000 times to generate a "placebo" measure
of the timing and degree of securitization, SEC
P;k
t : First, we run
￿e ck











to check in how many cases ￿P
1 would be negative and more signi￿cant as the actual SECk
t .
Second, we regard both the placebo and the actual securitization dummy jointly and report in
how many cases their regression coe¢ cients are individually negative and signi￿cant according
to Newey and West corrected t-statistics (Newey and West (1987)), i.e.
￿e ck












Panel A gives the percentage of cases in which we ￿nd signi￿cant estimates of the ￿rst exercise,
panel B provides the results for the second exercise.
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35Table VI: Risk sharing, cay and securitisation
The table presents results from the regression:
￿e ck











t ￿z = ￿0+￿1cayt+￿2SECk
t +￿3cayt￿SECk
t +￿4t
where "t" denotes a time trend, SECk
t is a dummy that indicates when and qualitatively
to what extent countries in our sample allowed the securitisation of mortgages. The variable
cayt is the residual from the cointegration relation between consumption, asset wealth and
labour income in the U.S. freely available on Martin Lettau￿ s website. Our panel regression
estimates are obtained for the time period from 1985Q1 - 2008Q1. Robust t-statistics (Newey-
West (1987)) appear below the estimates in parentheses.
sample period:1985Q1 - 2008Q1
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36Table A.I : Trend in ￿nancial integration (equity) and
securitization
This table presents estimates from the regression:
￿e ck










U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1SECk















portfolio equity assets and liabilities of country k at time t and FDIAk
t as well as FDILk
t
foreign direct investments on asset and liability side of country k at time t. It thus summa-
rizes the gross equity positions of the countries under study relative to GDP. Robust t-statistics
(Newey and West (1987)) appear in parentheses below the estimates. The sample period runs
from 1985Q1 to 2004Q4.
sample period: 1985Q1 - 2004Q4
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37Table A.II: Financial integration and securitization (variation
across countries)
This table presents estimates from the regression
￿e ck




















with FAkt gross foreign assets of country k at time
t and FLkt gross foreign liabilities of country k at time t. It thus takes into account the
variation in the gross foreign asset positions of the countries under study relative to GDP.
Robust t-statistics (Newey and West (1987)) appear in parentheses below the estimates. The
sample period runs from 1985Q1 to 2004Q4.
sample period: 1985Q1 - 2004Q4







































38Table A.III : Financial integration and securitization
(equity-based, variation across countries)
This table presents estimates from the regression:
￿e ck




























equity assets and liabilities of country k at time t and FDIAk
t as well as FDILk
t foreign direct
investments on asset and liability side of country k at time t. It thus takes into account variation
in the gross equity positions of the countries under study relative to GDP. Robust t-statistics
(Newey and West (1987)) appear in parentheses below the estimates. The sample period runs
from 1985Q1 to 2004Q4.
sample period: 1985Q1 - 2004Q4







































39Table A.IV: Actual securitization measure
Panel A of this table displays the results from our baseline risk sharing regression:
￿e ck
t = ￿0￿g gdp
k
t + ￿1SECk
t ￿ ￿g gdp
k




t denotes idiosyncratic consumption growth, ￿g gdp
k
t idiosyncratic GDP growth
and SECk
t is a qualitative measure that indicates when and to what extent country k has
introduced the securitization of mortgage payments. The countries under study are: Australia,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Robust
t-statistics (Newey and West (1987)) are in parentheses below the estimates. The sample period
runs from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1. Panel B provides the corresponding results if we construct an
approximation of the degree of securitization based on actual data, SEC
k;act
t . Details on
the construction of SEC
k;act
t are provided in the appendix.
Panel A: qualitative securitization measure (SECk
t )












Panel B: actual securitization measure (SEC
k;act
t )
































































Figure 1: Pairwise correlations of quarterly housing and equity returns for
the 16 industrialized countries under study. The sample period is
1985Q1:2008Q1. The black line is the 45-degree line.





















































Figure 2: Trend in the qualitative degree of securitization over the sample
period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1. Country acronyms indicate which countries
introduced mortgage securitization at the respective date.















































































Figure 3: Amount of home mortgages outstanding used to back securities in the
U.S. in billions of dollar for the time period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1.











Figure 4: U.S. cay (multiplied by 10) vs. 12-quarter moving average of risk sharing
coe¢ cients obtained from a sequence of cross-sectional risk sharing regressions
￿e ck
t = ￿(t)￿g gdp
k
t + ￿t + "k
t.
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